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With the formation of European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, the eleven countries
that adopted the Euro began to conduct a single monetary policy oriented towards union-
wide objectives. The objective of this paper is to construct a small model of the Euro area,
which may serve as a laboratory for evaluating the performance of alternative monetary
policy strategies for the Euro area in the vein of recent studies for the United States.
In estimating this model, we start with the relationship between output and inﬂation
and investigate the nominal wage contracting model due to Taylor (1980) as well as three
dierent versions of the relative real wage contracting model rst proposed by Buiter and
Jewitt (1981) and investigated empirically with U.S. data by Fuhrer and Moore (1995a).
Contrary to Fuhrer and Moore, who reject the nominal contracting model and prefer a ver-
sion of the relative contracting model which induces a higher degree of inﬂation persistence,
we nd that both types of contracting models t the data for the Euro area. The best tting
specication, however, is a version of the relative contracting model, which is theoretically
more plausible than the simplied version preferred by Fuhrer and Moore. These ndings
are relevant to the continuing debate on sticky- inﬂation versus sticky-price models (for
example Roberts (1997), Sbordone (1999), Gali and Gertler (1999) and Taylor (1999)) and
may have important implications for the short-run inﬂation-output tradeo faced by the
Eurosystem.
A drawback of the Euro area estimation is that the data are averages of the member
economies, which experienced dierent monetary policy regimes prior to the formation of
EMU. While Germany enjoyed stable inﬂation with fairly predictable monetary policy,
countries such as France and Italy experienced a long-drawn out and probably imperfectly
anticipated disinﬂation. To investigate the validity of our results, we also estimate the
contracting models for France, Germany and Italy separately. We nd that the relative
contracting model dominates in countries which transitioned out of a high inﬂation regime
such as France and Italy, while the nominal contracting model ts German data better.
Thus, an optimist may conclude that the independent European Central Bank will face a
similar environment in the future as the Bundesbank did in Germany and pick the nominal
contracting specication, while a pessimist, who suspects that stabilizing Euro area inﬂation
will require higher output losses, may want to pick the relative contracting specication.
A robust monetary policy strategy, however, should perform reasonably well in both cases.
We close the model by imposing a term-structure relationship and estimating an aggregate
demand relationship. We then evaluate the performance of Taylor's rule as an example.
21 Introduction
With the formation of European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, the eleven countries
that adopted the Euro began to conduct a single monetary policy oriented towards union-
wide objectives.1 As prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty the primary goal of this policy
is to maintain price stability within the Euro area. The operational denition of this goal
announced by the European Central Bank (ECB) is to aim for year-on-year increases in the
Euro-area inﬂation rate below 2 percent.2 To evaluate alternative strategies for achieving
such a Euro-area-wide objective, it is essential to build empirical models that can be used
to assess the area-wide impact of policy on key macroeconomic variables such as output and
inﬂation. Thus, the objective of this paper is to construct a small model of the Euro area,
which may serve as a laboratory for evaluating the performance of alternative monetary
policy strategies in the vein of recent studies for the United States.3
One possible approach to building a model of the Euro area is to start from the bottom
up by constructing separate models of the individual member economies and then link these
models together in a multi-country model. The main alternative is to rst aggregate the
relevant macroeconomic time series across member economies, and then estimate a model
for the Euro area as a whole. In this paper, we pursue the latter approach, the reason
being that the objectives as well as the instruments of Eurosystem monetary policy are
dened on the Euro-area level. Of course, a problem with this approach is that the data
1Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal
and Spain. Denmark, Sweden, Greece and the U.K., who have not adopted the Euro, are not part of the
Euro area. Their central banks, however, are members of the European System of Central Banks but not
of the Eurosystem, which comprises the central banks of the countries that adopted the Euro as well as the
European Central Bank.
2As measured by the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). It was further claried that this
denition excludes decreases, thus implying a range from 0 to 2 %. A detailed discussion of these and other
issues regarding the ECB's strategy can be found in Angeloni, Gaspar and Tristani (1999).
3The recent literature on evaluating monetary policy rules for the U.S. economy has used a variety
of macro models, including small-scale backward-looking models such as Rudebusch and Svensson (1999),
large-scale backward-looking models such as Fair and Howrey (1996), small-scale models with forward-
looking rational expectations and nominal rigidities (cf. Fuhrer and Moore (1995a), (1995b), Fuhrer (1997a),
Orphanides, Small, Wieland and Wilcox (1998)), large-scale models of this type such as Taylor (1993a) and
the Federal Reserve Board's FRB/US model (cf. Brayton et al. (1997)) as well as small models with
optimizing agents such as Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and McCallum and Nelson (1999). Recent
comparative studies of interest include Bryant, Hooper and Mann (1993) and Taylor (1999).
1used in aggregation stems from periods prior to EMU, when the dierent member economies
experienced dierent monetary regimes and policies. For this reason, we also estimate every
model specication separately for the three largest member economies, France, Germany
and Italy, which together comprise over 70% of economic activity in the Euro area. By
comparing the estimates obtained with French, German and Italian data to the Euro area
estimates, we can assess to what extent the choice of model specication for the Euro
area is inﬂuenced by the aggregation itself. Furthermore, by comparing France and Italy,
which experienced a convergence process prior to EMU, with Germany, which enjoyed stable
inﬂation and interest rates, we can see whether the choice of specication is inﬂuenced by
dierences in the monetary regime prior to EMU.
In building our small-scale Euro-area model we start with the relationship between
inﬂation and output. In this respect we make three modelling assumptions, which are
central to the key tradeo that central banks are faced with, that is, the tradeo between
inﬂation and output variability. First, monetary policy has short-run real eects due to
the existence of overlapping wage contracts. Second, expectations in labor, nancial and
goods markets are formed in a forward-looking, rational manner. Third, in estimating
Euro-area inﬂation dynamics with pre-EMU data, we use the deviations of inﬂation from
the downward trend, which was generated by the convergence of inﬂation in Italy, France,
Spain and other member countries to German levels, rather than the inﬂation rate itself.
Following this modelling approach, we obtain several new ndings, which are relevant to
the recent empirical literature on nominal rigidities, and may have important implications
for the policy tradeos faced by the ECB.
As to overlapping wage contracts, we explore the empirical t of the nominal wage con-
tracting model due to Taylor (1980) as well as three dierent versions of the relative real
wage contracting model rst proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (1981) and investigated empir-
ically by Fuhrer and Moore (1995a). The nominal contracting model belongs to the class
of New-Keynesian sticky-price models which { as shown in the recent theoretical literature
2{ are consistent with intertemporal optimization by imperfectly competitive rms.4 How-
ever, Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) have argued that the nominal contracting model cannot
explain the degree of inﬂation persistence observed in U.S. data, while the relative real wage
contracting model induces sucient inﬂation stickiness. Of course, this dierence has im-
portant policy implications. In the nominal contracting model, the central bank can commit
to a policy, which achieves disinﬂation without recession, but not in the relative contracting
model. Comparing these alternative specications, we nd that the relative wage contract-
ing model ts Euro area inﬂation dynamics better than the nominal contracting model.
Among the three dierent versions of the relative real wage contracting model, it is not the
simplied specication preferred by Fuhrer and Moore, but a theoretically more plausible
specication, which obtains the best t. We also note that the nominal contracting model
cannot be rejected by the data. Comparing the estimates for the individual countries, we
nd that the same relative wage contracting model ts Italian and French data quite well,
but not the German data, which exhibits a substantially lower degree of inﬂation persis-
tence. Only the nominal contracting model seems to have a shot at explaining inﬂation
dynamics in Germany.
Fuhrer and Moore's empirical ndings have generated a continuing debate on the sources
of inﬂation stickiness. Roberts (1997) showed that a sticky-inﬂation model with rational
expectations is observationally equivalent to a sticky-price model with expectations that
are imperfectly rational and, using data on survey expectations in the U.S., found evidence
of backward-looking behavior. More recently, Sbordone (1998) and Gali and Gertler (1999)
have argued that the New-Keynesian sticky-price model is capable of explaining U.S. in-
ﬂation dynamics, if one uses a measure of marginal cost rather than the output gap as
the determinant of inﬂation.5 Finally, Taylor (1999) has pointed out that expectations of
inﬂation inﬂuence the pricing power of rms, and argued that inﬂation is more persistent
4See Goodfriend and King (1997) for a comprehensive survey.
5As the authors show, a model with price-stickiness is sucient in this case, because marginal costs
themselves exhibit persistence. An open question, which needs to be settled in order to construct a complete
macro model, concerns the source of the observed persistence in marginal costs.
3in a high inﬂation regime than in a low inﬂation regime with credible monetary policy.
Our comparative analysis contributes to this debate in two ways. The assumption of
rational expectations implies that market expectations take into account the decision rule
of the policymaker. This case serves as a useful benchmark for policy evaluation, because
the alternative assumption of backward-looking expectations would imply that the central
bank can exploit systematic expectational errors by market participants. However, as noted
by Roberts (1997), a large degree of inﬂation persistence as in the Italian, French and Euro
area data, may be evidence of adaptive expectations rather than structural rigidities. Such
backward-looking behavior would seem plausible in those countries, since the downward
trend in inﬂation may at best have been imperfectly anticipated by market participants.
Thus, as far as the future of the EMU is concerned, the estimation based on historical
Euro-area data may overstate the case for the relative real wage contracting model. This
conclusion is supported by the better t of the nominal contracting model in Germany,
where inﬂation was rather stable and monetary policy fairly predictable. The better t of
this model with German data also provides empirical support to the thesis that the degree
of inﬂation persistence is lower in a stable monetary policy regime with low average inﬂation
as suggested by Taylor (1999).
The downward trend in Euro area inﬂation, which arose from the convergence process
in countries such as Italy, Spain and France, should not be expected to persist nor to be
reversed in the future, if the ECB achieves its policy objective. The short-run variations
around this trend, however, to the extent that they were due to structural rigidities, may
still help predicting the inﬂation dynamics after the formation of EMU. In principle, a
complete model of the European inﬂation process prior to EMU would need to account for
both, the short-run variations as well as the long-run convergence. However, describing
the latter process appropriately, would require taking into account the varying degree of
credibility of exchange rate pegs, the possibility of crises and realignments and learning
by market participants about the long-run inﬂation objectives of European policymakers.
Such an analysis would be beyond the objective of this paper. Instead, we take a short-
4cut and simply detrend the Euro-area, French and Italian inﬂation rates. We then use
the resulting inﬂation gap series together with series for the output gap to estimate the
structural overlapping contracts models. This assumption would have been correct, if the
disinﬂation had been fully anticipated, but if not, it could lead us to underestimate the
degree of inﬂation persistence and understate the case for the relative real wage specication.
Again, the estimation with German data provides a useful benchmark for comparison,
because it is the only case for which the inﬂation series exhibits no strong trend. In addition,
we conduct a sensitivity study to assess how our Euro-area estimates would change if market
participants had been consistently surprised by the downward trend.
In terms of evaluating alternative monetary policy strategies for the Euro area, an
analyst who is pessimistic about the output losses associated with stabilizing inﬂation might
prefer to use the best tting version of the relative wage contracting model. An optimist
might prefer to use the nominal wage contracting model with the coecients estimated with
German data. A robust monetary policy strategy however should perform reasonably well
under both specications. We provide an illustrative example for the case of Taylor's rule.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the overlapping contracts specications.
The data is discussed in section 3. Section 4 summarizes inﬂation and output dynamics in
form of unconstrained VAR models, while the structural estimates of the contracting spec-
ications by means of simulation-based indirect inference methods are reported in section
5. In section 6 we close the model with an aggregate demand equation, a term structure
equation and a policy rule. Impulse responses and disinﬂation scenarios under alternative
specications are compared in section 7. Section 8 concludes and the appendix provides the
details of the indirect estimation methodology.
2 Modelling Inﬂation Dynamics with Overlapping Contracts
We estimate four dierent specications of overlapping wage contracts, the nominal wage
contracting model of Taylor (1980) and three variants of the relative real wage contract-
ing model estimated by Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) (FM in the following) for the United
5States. While these models are motivated by the existence of long-term wage contracts,
the implications for price and wage dynamics are essentially the same if prices are related
to wages by a xed markup. Thus, we follow FM in using price data instead of wage data
in estimation, and from here on we use the terms \contract price" and \contract wage"
interchangeably.6
A common feature of the four specications is that the log aggregate price index in the
current quarter, pt, is a weighted average of the log contract wages, xt−i (i =0 ;1;:::),
which were negotiated in the current and the preceding quarters and are still in eect. The
sticky price index can be observed directly, while the ﬂexible contract wage is an unobserved
variable. As a benchmark we consider the case of a one-year weighted average:
pt = f0 xt + f1 xt−1 + f2 xt−2 + f3 xt−3: (1)
The weights fi (i =0 ;1;2;3) on contract wages from dierent periods are assumed to be
time-invariant, fi  0a n d
P
i fi = 1. As shown in Taylor (1980), these weights would be
equal to .25, if 25 percent of all workers sign contracts each quarter and if each contract
lasts one year. Taylor (1993a) provides an interpretation for the more general case with
unequal weights in terms of the distribution of workers by lengths of contracts. He shows
that the weights fi are time-invariant, if the distribution of workers by contract length
is time-invariant and if the variation of average contract wages over contracts of dierent
length is negligible.7 Restricting the number of lags in (1) to three is consistent with a
maximum contract length of four quarters.8 Rather than estimating each of the weights
fi separately, we follow FM and assume that the weights are a downward-sloping linear
function of contract length, s.t. fi = :25 + (1:5 − i)s, where s 2 (0;1=6]. This distribution
depends on a single parameter, the slope s.
The determination of the nominal contract wage xt for the dierent specications is
6For recent studies considering both, wage and price stickiness, see Taylor (1993a), Erceg, Henderson and
Levin (1999) and Amato and Laubach (1999).
7For the derivation see Taylor (1993a), pp. 35-38.
8Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) found this lag length sucient to explain the degree of persistence in U.S.
inﬂation data. Similarly, Taylor (1993a) estimated the nominal contracting model for all G-7 countries with
such a lag length.
6best explained starting with Taylor's nominal wage contracting model (the NW model in
the following). In this case, xt is negotiated with reference to the price level that is expected
to prevail over the life of the contract, as well as the expected degree of excess demand over











+ x x;t: (2)
The structural shock term, x;t, is scaled by the parameter x, which denotes its standard
deviation. Since the price indices pt+i are functions of contemporaneous and preceding
contract wages, equation (2) implies that in negotiating the current contract wage, agents
look at an average of the nominal contract wages that were negotiated in the recent past as
well as those that are expected to be negotiated in the near future. In other words, they take
into account nominal wages that apply to overlapping contracts. In addition, wage setters
take into account expected demand conditions. For example, when they expect demand
to exceed potential, qt+i > 0, the current contract wage is adjusted upwards relative to
contracts negotiated recently or expected to be negotiated in the near future. The parameter
γ measures the sensitivity of contract wages to the future excess demand term.
Next, we turn to the relative real wage contracting specication (the RW specication
in the following). In this case, wage setters compare the average real wage over the life of
their contract with the real wages negotiated on overlapping contracts in the recent past
and near future. While this comparison is carried out in real terms, it is still the nominal
wage that is negotiated. It remains to dene the two elements of this comparison. The
average real contract wage is dened using the weighted average of current and future price
indices prevailing over the life of the contracts, denoted by  pt:
xRW







To summarize real wages on nearby contracts it is helpful to dene an index of real contract





t−i −  pt−i): (4)
The current nominal contract wage under the RW specication is then determined by:
xRW
t − Et [ pt]=E t
" 3 X
i=0





+ x x;t: (5)
In this case, agents negotiate the real wage under contracts signed in the current period
with reference to the average real contract wage index expected to prevail over the current
and the next three quarters. Thus, in negotiating current contracts agents compare the
current real contract wage to an average of the real contract wages that were negotiated in
the recent past and those expected to be negotiated in the near future. Again, agents also
adjust for expected demand conditions and push for a higher real contract wage when they
expect output above potential.
For the RW specication a subtle but important question arises with respect to the
timing of the price expectations in the real contract wage indices vt+i. For example, the
current contract wage xt depends on the index of real contract wages currently in eect, vt,
which in turn is a function of the real contract wages from periods t−1, t−2a n dt−3. The
question is whether as in equation (5) the relevant reference points for the determination
of the current contract wage are the ex-post realized real contract wages from these periods,
which are now known to wage setters, or the ex-ante expected real contract wages,w h i c h
formed the basis of the negotiations in earlier periods. To give an example, the average
real contract wage from period t−1, which enters the index vt in (4) conditional on period
t information, would then be dened as xRW
t−1 − (f0 pt−1 + f1 pt + f2 Et[pt+1]+f3 Et[pt+2]).
In period t − 1, however, the real wage considered in the negotiations was conditioned on
period t − 1 information, xRW
t−1 − (f0 pt−1 + f1 Et−1[pt]+f2 Et−1[pt+1]+f3 Et−1[pt+2]).
Since both denitions seem plausible, we will consider both in estimation. We refer
to the relative contracting specication with price expectations conditioned on historically
available information as the RW-C specication and redene the equations (4) and (5)
accordingly.
8Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) discuss the RW and RW-C specication only in the appendix
of their paper. Their preferred specication for U.S. data, which is the main focus of their
paper, was instead a simplied version of the RW model, which they chose based on a
specication test. The simplication concerns the denition of the average real contract
wage. Instead of using the average price level expected to prevail over the life of the
contracts, Et[ pt]=E t[
P3
i=0 fi pt+i], they simply use the current price level, pt. Thus, the
current real wage simplies to xRW
t − pt and the index of real contract wages that are in
eect, vt, simplies to
P3
i=0 fi(xRW
t−i −pt−i). We refer to this case as the RW-S specication.
In this case the index vt no longer uses price expectations. Consequently, the point regarding
the timing of these expectations discussed above is mute.
Before turning to the data used in estimation, we note that although the above specica-
tions are written in terms of the price level, they can be rewritten in terms of the quarterly
inﬂation rate. Thus, either price levels or inﬂation rates can be used in estimation. Fur-
thermore, we note that the contracting specications only pin down the steady-state real
contract wage, but not the steady-state inﬂation rate. Steady-state inﬂation will eventually
be determined by the central bank's inﬂation target, once we close the model in section 6.
3 The Data
The data we use are quarterly series of inﬂation, the output gap and the short-term nominal
interest rate. As noted previously, using price data instead of wage data in estimating
staggered contracting specications is usually justied by linking prices to wages with a
simple markup equation. The measures we use for output and prices are real GDP and the
GDP deﬂator. The interest rate is the three-month money market rate. To obtain measures
for the Euro area we aggregate over data for ten of the eleven member countries (excluding
Luxembourg) using xed 1993 GDP weights at PPP rates.9
The historical path of these Euro-area aggregates between 1974:1 and 1998:4 is shown
9This data is drawn from the ECB area-wide model database (see Fagan et al. (1999)) The weights for
the 10 Euro-area countries are as follows: Austria (.0306), Belgium (.0392), Finland (.0157), France (.2166),
Germany (.3016), Ireland (.0099), Italy (.2043), the Netherlands (.0541), Portugal (.0234) and Spain (.1045).
9in Figure 1. As shown in the top left panel average inﬂation in the Euro area steadily
declined over the last 25 years. Similarly, the average short-term nominal interest rate
depicted in the top right panel tended to decline from the mid 1980s onwards except for
the EMS crises in the early 1990s. This downward trend is a unique feature of Euro-area
data and complicates the empirical investigation of European inﬂation dynamics relative to
similar analyses for the United States. We will return to this issue below.
The contracting model in section 2 relates the short-run dynamics of inﬂation to the
output gap. While a measure for actual real GDP in the Euro area is available and shown
in the bottom left panel of Figure 1 (solid line), we need to estimate the unobservable
potential output. Constructing a structural estimate of potential for the Euro area prior to
EMU goes beyond the objective of this paper. Even for the individual member countries
this would be rather dicult. A common alternative estimate of potential used in the
macroeconomic modelling literature is the log-linear trend (see for example Fuhrer and
Moore (1995a) and Taylor (1993a) among many others), which is shown as the dashed line
in the bottom left panel. The bottom right panel compares the output gap implied by the
log-linear trend to the OECD's (1999) estimate of the Euro-area output gap (dotted line).
Since these estimates are surprisingly similar, except for a small dierence in the 1990s, we
will follow Taylor and Fuhrer and Moore in using output gaps based on a log-linear trend
for estimating the overlapping contracts model.10
The source of the downward trend in Euro-area inﬂation noted previously is directly
apparent from Figure 2. As shown in the top left panel inﬂation rates in the early 1970s
were much higher in countries such as France and Italy than in Germany due to oil price
shocks and accommodative monetary policy. It took 10 to 15 years, respectively, for French
and Italian inﬂation rates to decline to German levels. Convergence in inﬂation rates was
accompanied by convergence in nominal interest rates in the late 1990s as can be seen from
10Other alternatives include estimates based on the HP lter or unobserved components methods. We
have conducted some sensitivity studies in this respect. We stick with the linear trend as our benchmark for
comparability with the results obtained by Fuhrer and Moore and Taylor for the U.S. and because of the
similarity to the OECD estimate of the Euro-area output gap.
10the upper right panel of Figure 2. Over time, as economic convergence and the future
formation of a monetary union became more widely expected the inﬂation premium incor-
porated in Italian and French short-term nominal interest rates relative to German rates
eventually disappeared. This convergence process and the role of the European Monetary
System (EMS) in its context have been widely debated and analyzed in the academic and
policy literature of the last decade. There is little doubt that the decline of inﬂation has
largely been due to the growing commitment on the part of monetary policy makers in the
Euro area to achieve and maintain low inﬂation. The credibility of this commitment, how-
ever, likely varied over time, probably being rather low in the early stages of the EMS in the
early and mid 1980s and higher during the \hard" EMS period in the late 1980s up to the
EMS crises in 1992 and 1993. Following these crises credibility regarding the central banks'
commitment to achieve low inﬂation likely increased again with the progress of preparations
for EMU. To the extent that disinﬂation during these periods was credible and expected by
wage and price setters, the associated output losses should have been rather low. In fact,
a casual comparison of the extent of disinﬂation in Italy and France relative to Germany
and the output gap estimates for these three economies based on the log-linear trends that
are shown in the bottom right panel of Figure 2, suggests that the disinﬂations in Italy
and France did not require large and protracted recessions and thus may have been partly
anticipated.
Conceivably, one could attempt to model and estimate the processes of expectations and
credibility regarding policy targets and exchange rate pegs throughout the 1980s and 1990s
explicitly in the context of a complete macroeconomic model. This would go beyond the
objective of our paper. Instead we simply approximate the implicit time-varying inﬂation
objective with a linear trend, and then estimate the overlapping contracts models using
inﬂation deviations from this trend. We detrend the average inﬂation rate for the Euro area
as well as the French and Italian inﬂation rates in this manner. Similar approaches have
been used by other researchers with regard to European inﬂation data, notably Gerlach and
11Svensson (1999) and Cecchetti, McConnell and Quiros (1999).11 This approach would be
appropriate, if the source of the disinﬂation had been a fully expected and credible reduction
in the policymakers' inﬂation target having been gradually phased in. However, given this
was not the case, this approach introduces an error that may bias our estimation results. In
particular, it could lead us to underestimate the degree of inﬂation persistence and possibly
understate the case for the relative real wage specication. We return to this question later
on.
4 Empirical Inﬂation and Output Dynamics
Our empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. In the rst stage, we estimate an uncon-
strained bivariate VAR model of Euro-area output and inﬂation. In the second stage, we
use this unconstrained VAR as an auxiliary model in estimating the structural overlap-
ping wage contracting specications by indirect inference methods. These methods are a
simulation-based procedure for calibrating the parameters of the structural model by match-
ing its reduced form, which corresponds to a constrained VAR, as closely as possible with
the estimated unconstrained VAR model.
The unconstrained VAR provides an empirical summary description of Euro-area inﬂa-
tion and output dynamics.12 We estimate the short-run dynamics jointly with a determinis-
tic linear trend for inﬂation and the logarithm of output over the sample period. Following
Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) we then compute the autocorrelation functions implied by the
VAR including the associated asymptotic condence bands.13
These autocorrelation functions indicate that the lead-lag relationship between inﬂation
11Gerlach and Svensson use an exponential trend for the Euro-area inﬂation rate in estimating a P-star
model of inﬂation dynamics  a la Hallman, Porter and Small (1991) for the Euro area. Cecchetti et al.
construct inﬂation and output deviations from a 12-month moving average of actual values and estimate
inﬂation-output tradeos based on this data for a number of Euro-area economies.
12Although interest rates are important determinants of output and inﬂation, we restrict attention to
bivariate VARs without including an interest rate, primarily because it is unclear what would be an appro-
priate interest rate for the Euro area. We return to this problem later on in section 6 when estimating an
aggregate demand equation that closes the small macroeconomic model.
13For a detailed discussion of the methodology and the derivation of the asymptotic condence bands for
the estimated autocorrelation functions the reader is referred to Coenen (2000).
12and output is consistent with a short-run tradeo, that is, with a short-run Phillips curve.
Furthermore, the estimated autocorrelation functions constitute a benchmark against which
we can evaluate the ability of the alternative overlapping contracts specications to explain
the dynamics of inﬂation in Euro-area data. Such an approach has also been recommended
by McCallum (1999), who argued that autocovariance and autocorrelation functions are a
more appropriate device for confronting macroeconomic models with the data than impulse
response functions because of their purely descriptive nature.
The empirical model for output and inﬂation, written in terms of the level of inﬂation,





















where t and qt refer to the inﬂation and the output gap respectively, which are determined


























The Ai matrices (i =1 ;2;3) contain the coecients on the rst three lags of the inﬂation
and the output gap.14 The error terms u;t and uq;t are assumed to be serially uncorrelated
with mean zero and positive denite covariance matrix u.
We t this model to the aggregated output and inﬂation data for the Euro area as
a whole for the period from 1974:Q1 to 1998:Q4. Since we are merely interested in the
parameters of the VAR model (7), we proceed in two steps. First, we detrend the data by a
simple projection technique and then we estimate the parameters of the VAR model, that
is the coecient matrices Ai and the covariance matrix u by Quasi-Maximum-Likelihood
(QML) methods.15 The estimates of the unconstrained VAR model are shown in Table 1.
Standard lag selection procedures based on the HQ and SC criteria suggest that a lag order
of 2 would be sucient to capture the empirical inﬂation and output dynamics. The Ljung-
Box Q(12) statistic indicates serially uncorrelated residuals with a marginal probability
14Here, we use a maximum lag order of 3, simply because this corresponds to the reduced-form VAR
representation of the overlapping contract models of section 2 with a contract length of 4 quarters.
15For some more detail refer to the appendix, section A.2.
13value of 42:8%. The estimates of the parameters of the VAR(2) model are shown in panel A
of Table 1. Our point estimates imply that the smallest root of the characteristic equation
det(I2−A1 z−A2 z2)=0i s1 :2835, thereby suggesting that the inﬂation and output gap are
stationary. Our ndings are supported by the results of standard univariate Dickey-Fuller
tests for the presence of unit roots.
We also estimate an unconstrained VAR(3) model. This is of interest, because all
contracting specications discussed in section 2 have a reduced form which is a constrained
VAR of order 3 if the maximum contract length is one year. To assess the sensitivity of
our results to the lag length, we will use the VAR(2) and VAR(3) models in parallel in the
estimation of the contracting specications in the following section. On a statistical basis,
the third lag would not be absolutely necessary, as can be seen from panel B in Table 1,
which shows that the A3 coecients are insignicant.
The autocorrelations functions associated with the unconstrained VAR(3) model of the
Euro area are depicted in Figure 3. The diagonal elements show the autocorrelations
of the detrended inﬂation rate and the output gap, the o-diagonal elements the lagged
cross correlations, The solid lines represent the point estimates, while the dotted lines
indicate 95% condence bands. Both inﬂation and output are quite persistent with positive
autocorrelations out to lags of about 5 and 8 quarters which are highly signicant. The
cross correlations in the o-diagonal panels conrm much of conventional wisdom about
inﬂation and output dynamics. For example, in the second panel of the top row, a high
level of output is followed by a high level of inﬂation a year later and again these cross
correlations are statistically signicant. In the rst panel of the bottom row a high level
of inﬂation is followed by a low level of output a year later. These lead-lag interactions
are highly indicative of the existence of a conventional short-run tradeo between output
and inﬂation. All in all these correlations are stylized facts which any structural model of
output and inﬂation dynamics ought to be able to explain.
The results for the bivariate VARs of order 3 for France, Germany and Italy are sum-
14marized in Table 2.16 Again, the VAR model seems fairly successful at summarizing the
observed inﬂation and output dynamics. Note that for Germany the estimates are obtained
without a trend in inﬂation, (a1; = 0). The estimated autocorrelation functions for out-
put and inﬂation in France and Italy display qualitative similar characteristics than for the
Euro area as a whole, in particular regarding the persistence in inﬂation and output varia-
tions. The cross correlations, however, are somewhat smaller. As to Germany, the degree
of persistence in inﬂation is substantially lower and the correlations between current output
and lagged inﬂation have the opposite sign, albeit statistically insignicant. We return to
these issues in the next section, when we use the empirical autocorrelation functions as a
benchmark to evaluate the t of alternative structural overlapping contracts specications.
5 Estimating the Overlapping Contracts Specications
In the following we use the unconstrained VAR models as approximating probability models
in estimating the coecients of the dierent overlapping contracts specications discussed
in section 2. As can be seen from equations (1) through (5) there are only three structural
parameters to estimate for each specication: (i) the slope of the contracting distribution
s that determines the series of contract weights fi; (ii) the sensitivity of the contract wage
to expected future aggegrate demand over the life of the contract γ; and (iii) the standard
deviation of the contract wage shock x.
Of course, the overlapping contracts specications discussed in section 2 do not represent
a complete model of inﬂation determination. Since the contract wage equations (2) and (5)
contain expected future output gaps, we need to specify how the output gap is determined
in order to solve for the reduced-form representation of inﬂation and output dynamics un-
der each of the contracting specications. A full-information estimation approach would
require a complete macroeconomic model and estimate all the models's structural parame-
ters jointly. A simple version of such a model would include an aggregate demand equation,
16To save space, we do not report separate gures for the estimated autocorrelation functions. Instead,
see the dotted lines in Figures 5 to 7, which depict the accompanying asymptotic condence bands.
15which relates output gaps to ex-ante long-term real rates, as well as a Fisher equation, a
term structure relationship and a monetary policy rule. While our ultimate objective in this
paper is to build precisely such a model, we take a less ambitious approach in estimating
the contracting parameters. We simply use the output gap equation from the unconstrained
VAR models, which corresponds to the second row in (7), for output determination. This
limited-information approach is close to the estimation approaches used by Taylor (1993a)
and Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) and is likely to be more robust than a full-information ap-
proach. We estimate the aggregate demand equation later on by single-equation methods
and discuss those results in the next section.
Using the output equation from the unconstrained VAR together with the wage-price
block from section 2, we can solve for the reduced-form inﬂation and output dynamics under
each of the four dierent contracting specications (RW, RW-C, RW-S and NW).17 For this
purpose it is convenient to rewrite the wage-price block, which was originally dened in
levels of nominal contract wages and prices, in terms of the real contract wage xpt = xt−pt
and the annualized quarterly inﬂation rate t. The reduced-form solution of this rational
expectations model is a trivariate constrained VAR. While the quarterly inﬂation rate t
and the output gap qt are observable variables, the real contract wage xpt is unobservable.
For a contracting specication with a one-year maximum contract length this constrained




































5 + B0 t; (8)
where the Bi matrices (i =0 ;1;2;3) contain the coecients of the constrained VAR and t
is a vector of serially uncorrelated error terms with mean zero and positive (semi-) denite
covariance matrix which is assumed to be diagonal with its non-zero elements normalized
to unity.
The coecients in the bottom row of the Bi matrices coincide exactly with coecients
17We assume that ouput and wage expectations in the contract wage equations are formed rationally, and
use the AIM algorithm of Anderson and Moore (1985) for linear rational expectations models to solve for
the reduced form dynamics.
16of the output equation of the unconstrained VAR, with the B0 cocients obtained by means
of a Choleski decomposition of the covariance matrix u. The reduced-form coecients in
the upper two rows of the Bi matrices, which are associated with the determination of the
real contract wage and inﬂation, are functions of the structural parameters (s;γ;x)a s
well as the coecients of the output equation of the unconstrained VAR.
We estimate the structural parameters of the overlapping contracts specications s, γ
and x using the indirect inference methods proposed by Smith (1993) and Gouri eroux,
Monfort and Renault (1993) and developed further in Gouri eroux and Monfort (1995, 1996).
The estimation procedure, including its asymptotic properties, is discussed in detail in the
appendix of this paper. In the appendix we also compare this procedure to the Maximum-
Likelihood methods used by Taylor (1993a) and Fuhrer and Moore (1995a).
Indirect inference is a simulation-based procedure for calibrating a structural model with
the objective of nding parameter values such that its dynamic characteristics match the
dynamic properties of the observed data as summarised by an approximating probability
model. The latter should t the empirical dynamics reasonably well, but need not necessar-
ily nest the structural model. In the case at hand, the unconstrained VAR models discussed
in section 4 are natural candidates for such an approximating probability model.
For given values of the structural parameters (s;γ;x) and the parameters of the out-
put equation from the unconstrained VAR model (7), we simulate the reduced form of the
structural model, that is the constrained VAR model (8), to generate \articial" series for
the real contract wage, the inﬂation rate and the output gap. All that is needed for simula-
tion are three initial values for each of these variables and a sequence of random shocks.18
Subsequently we t the unconstrained VAR model to the articial series of inﬂation and the
output gap and match the simulation-based estimates of the inﬂation equation as closely as
possible with the empirical estimates by searching over the feasible space of the structural
18In estimation we use steady-state values as initial conditions and are careful to only use simulation data
for later periods that are essentially unaected by this choice of initial conditions. This issue is discussed in
more detail in the appendix, section A.3.
17parameters.19
Euro-area estimation results for the baseline version of the relative real wage contract-
ing model (RW), the version with price expectations conditioned on historically available
information (RW-C), the simplied version preferred by Fuhrer and Moore (RW-S) and the
nominal wage contracting model (NW) are reported in Table 3. As a sensitivity check
we consider both the VAR(2) and VAR(3) models estimated in section 4 as approximating
probability models.20 The estimation results indicate that all four contracting models t
the Euro-area inﬂation dynamics reasonably well, in particular when we allow for a maxi-
mum contract length of one year and thus three lags in the VAR. As can be seen from the
standard errors given in parentheses, the estimates of the structural parameters are in al-
most all cases statistically signicant, with the appropriate sign and economically signicant
magnitude.
We also compute the probability (P-) values of the test for the over-identifying restric-
tions, which were imposed when estimating the structural parameters. According to this
test, none of the four contracting specications is rejected by the data, when we use the
VAR(3) as approximating probability model and allow for a one-year maximum contract
length. When we use the VAR(2) model and constrain the maximum contract length to
three quarters, both, the RW-C and the RW-S specication can be rejected at convenient
condence levels, but not the RW or the NW specications. Though the estimates of the
real wage contracting specications are not directly comparable, since these imply struc-
tures with dierent degrees of forward-looking behaviour, it is worthwile to note that the
RW-S specication reveals stronger rigidities than the RW and the RW-C specications as
reﬂected by the smaller estimates of the slope parameter s of the contracting distributions.
While neither the RW nor the NW specication can be rejected, we use the associated
19We do not need data for the unobservable real contract wage since the unconstrained VAR is only tted
to the observable data for inﬂation and the output gap.
20In the case of the VAR(2) model, we restrict the maximum contract length in the structural contracting
specication to three quarters instead of one year, such that its lag order corresponds to that of the structural
model's reduced-form solution. In this case, the slope parameter s is restricted to lie in the interval (0;1=3].
Note, because of the dierence in its domain the magnitude of the slope parameter will not be directly
comparable across the specications with three-quarter and one-year maximum contract length, respectively.
18minimum value of the criterion function to discriminate between these two specications.
In the case of our preferred setup with one-year maximum contract length and, thus, the
VAR(3) model, the RW specication implies a higher P-value than the NW specication.
For the estimation based on the VAR(2) model, however, the NW specication entails a
higher P-value.
In sum, our ndings for the Euro area dier quite a bit from Fuhrer and Moore (1995a),
who reject the nominal wage contracting model for U.S. data and nd that the RW-S
specication of the relative wage contracting model ts the U.S. inﬂation dynamics better
than the theoretically more plausible RW specication.
To provide further insight regarding our estimation results, we compare the autocor-
relation functions implied by the constrained VAR(3) representation of each of the four
contracting models with the autocorrelation functions from the unconstrained VAR. As
shown in Figure 4, the autocorrelation functions for all four models tend to remain inside
the 95% condence bands (dotted lines) associated with the autocorrelation functions of
the unconstrained VAR. The three relative real wage contracting specications (RW: solid
line with bold dots, RW-C: dash-dotted line, RW-S: solid line) are rather similar. They
exhibit substantial inﬂation peristence and quite pronounced cross correlations that are in-
dicative of a short-run Phillips curve tradeo. The upper right panel indicates that high
levels of output are followed by high inﬂation, while the lower left panel shows that high
levels of inﬂation are followed by low levels of output. The only noticeable dierence from
the unconstrained VAR, is that the latter set of cross correlations are somewhat larger in
absolute magnitude for the constrained VAR. The autocorrelations for the nominal con-
tracting model (NW: dashed line) indicate a lower degree of inﬂation persistence and less
pronounced cross correlations than for the dierent relative wage contracting models.
As noted in the introduction to this paper, the estimation results with Euro-area data
may be questioned for a number of reasons. First of all, the data are articial in the
sense that they are only averages of the data from the member economies prior to the
formation of EMU. Furthermore, the member economies experienced dierent monetary
19policy regimes. While Germany enjoyed stable inﬂation with fairly predictable monetary
policy, other countries such as France and Italy experienced a long-drawn out convergence
process, which was not fully anticipated by market participants. As a result, Euro-area
inﬂation data exhibits a long decline which we removed from the data by subtracting a
linear trend.
Thus, to investigate the validity of our results, we also estimate the dierent contracting
models for France, Germany and Italy separately. The results are summarized in Table
4. Here we only focus on the case of the VAR(3) model. For France we reject the RW-C
and the RW-S specications, but not the RW and the NW specication. The NW model
exhibits the highest P-value. However, in this case the parameter measuring the sensitivity
to aggregate demand, γ, is statistically insignicant. The parameter estimates for the RW
specication are signicant and relatively close to the values obtained for the Euro area.
For Italy, which experienced the most dramatic transition process, the estimation of the
NW model did not converge. Instead, the RW and the RW-C model seem to t Italian
inﬂation data reasonably well and imply statistically signicant parameter estimates. For
Germany, where inﬂation exhibited no long-run trend, we nd that all three relative real
wage contracting models are strongly rejected by the data. While the nominal contracting
model is also rejected, it does t better in the sense of implying a higher P-value. The
parameter estimates for the NW model with German data are surprisingly close to the NW
estimates obtained with Euro area data.
Again, a promising alternative approach for evaluating the t of the RW and NW spec-
ications is to compare the autocorrelation functions of the constrained and unconstrained
VAR models. As shown in Figure 5 for France, the RW specication does better than the
NW specication in terms of tting the inﬂation persistence in the top left panel, but worse
in terms of tting the cross-correlations in the diagonal panels. In the case of Italy the RW
model comes very close to matching the empirical autocorrelations of inﬂation in the top
left panel of Figure 7, and also does reasonably well with regard to the cross correlations.
The results for Germany in Figure 6 are, as expected, quite dierent. The autocorrelation
20functions of the unconstrained VAR (solid line with dotted condence interval) indicated
a much smaller degree of inﬂation persistence and a counterintuitive, albeit statistically
insignicant, positive correlation between output and lagged inﬂation. Consequently, the
nominal contracting model has a better chance at tting German inﬂation dynamics than
the relative contracting models.
We conclude from these results that, both the RW and the NW specications are plau-
sible alternatives for the Euro area. On the one hand, the estimation with aggregated
Euro-area data indicates a slight preference for the relative wage contracting model. On
the other hand, the comparison between France, Germany and Italy suggests that this pref-
erence may partly be due to the high-inﬂation regime in countries such as France and Italy
and the fact that the subsequent long-run decline in inﬂation was not fully anticipated.
Thus, an optimist would conclude that the independent European Central Bank will likely
face a similar environment in the future as the Bundesbank did in Germany. In this case,
the inﬂation-output relationship is best characterized by the nominal contracting specica-
tion with the parameter estimates obtained with German data. A pessimist, who suspects
that stabilizing Euro-area inﬂation will require higher output losses, would instead prefer
to use the RW specication with parameter estimates based on Euro-area data. A robust
monetary policy strategy, however, should perform reasonably under both specications. In
the remainder of the paper we close the model by estimating an aggregate demand equation
and a term structure relationship and then evaluate the performance of Taylor's under these
two alternative wage contracting specications.
6 Closing the Model: Output Gaps and Interest Rates
We model aggregate demand with a simple reduced-form IS equation, which relates the
current output gap, qt, to two lags of itself and to the lagged long-term ex-ante real interest
rate, rl
t−1:
qt = 0 + 1 qt−1 + 2 qt−2 + 3 rl
t−1 + d d;t: (9)
21d;t denotes an unexpected demand shock re-scaled with the parameter d, which measures
the standard deviation of the demand shock. The rationale for including lags of output is
to account for habit persistence in consumption as well as adjustment costs and accelerator
eects in investment. We use the lagged instead of the contemperaneous value of the real
interest rate to allow for a transmission lag of monetary policy. For now we neglect the
possibility of eects of the real exchange rate and expected future income on aggregate
demand.21 Fuhrer and Moore (1995b) found that a similiar aggregate demand specication
ts U.S. output dynamics quite well.
Next we turn to the nancial sector and relate the long-term ex-ante real interest rate,
which aects aggregate demand, to the short-term nominal interest rate, which is the prin-
cipal instrument of monetary policy. Three equations determine the various interest rates
in the model. The short-term nominal interest rate, is
t, is set according to a Taylor-type
interest rate rule (see Taylor (1993b)). This rule incorporates policy responses to inﬂation
deviations from target and output deviations from potential output, and allows for some
degree of partial adjustment:
is
t = r is




t − )+q qt: (10)
r denotes the long-run equilibrium real rate, while  refers to the policymaker's target
for inﬂation. The inﬂation measure is the four-quarter moving average of the annualized





j=0 t−j = pt − pt−4, and the interest rate is
annualized.
As to the term structure, we rely on the accumulated forecasts of the short rate over two
years which, under the expectations hypothesis, will coincide with the long rate forecast for












21In the future, we plan to investigate how important these two factors are for the determination of Euro
area aggregate demand. Since the Euro area is a large, relatively closed economy, the exchange rate is likely
to play a less important role than it did in the individual member economies prior to EMU.
22By subtracting inﬂation expectations over the following 8 quarters, we then obtain the










To estimate the parameters of the aggregate demand equation (9) we rst construct the
ex-post real long-term rate as dened by equations (11) and (12) but replacing expected
future with realized values. We then proceed to estimate the parameters by means of Gen-
eralized Method of Moments (GMM) using lagged values of output, inﬂation and interest
rates as instruments. The estimation results are reported in Table 6. The sample period
for this estimation is 1974:4 to 1998:4.
Panel A refers to the estimates for the Euro area. In the rst row, the output gap
and interest rate data are area-wide GDP-PPP-weighted averages. The coecients on the
two lags of the output gap are signicant and exhibit an accelerator pattern. The interest
rate sensitivity of aggregate demand has the expected negative sign, however the parameter
estimate is only borderline signicant and rather small. It is not clear however, what is
the appropriate real interest rate measure for the Euro area. For example, instead of GDP
weights it may be a more appropriate to use the relative weights in debt nancing. Or, one
could make that the argument that the relevant rate for the Euro area was the German
interest rate. After all, movements in German interest rates presumably had to be mirrored
eventually by the other countries to the extent that they intended to maintain exchange rate
parities within the European Monetary System. For this reason we also use the German
real interest rate to estimate the interest rate sensitivity of Euro-area aggregate demand. In
this case, as shown in the second row, we nd similar coecients on the lags of the output
gap, but the estimate of the interest rate sensitivity is highly signicant an d three times
as large.
We have subjected this specication of aggregate demand to a battery of sensitivity
tests. For example, we have investigated alternative specications of potential output,
alternative horizons on the term structure equation, including the use of average long-term
23rates instead of a term structure based on short-term rates and we have varied the length
of the sample period. At least qualitatively the estimation results remain the same.
For comparison, we have also estimated the same specication for France, Germany and
Italy. In each case we use the domestic real interest rate. For France and Italy we obtain
qualitatively similar estimates as for the Euro area. For Germany however, the estimate
of the interest rate sensitivity is not signicant and the lags of output do not exhibit an
accelerator-type pattern.
It remains to discuss the deterministic steady state of this model. In steady state, the
output gap is zero and the long-term real rate is equal to the equilibrium real rate, r.T h i s
equilibrium rate is determined as a function of the parameters of the aggregate demand
curve (9), s.t. r = 0=3. The steady-state value of inﬂation is determined exclusively by
monetary policy. Since the overlapping contracts specications of the wage-price block do
not impose any restriction on the steady-state inﬂation rate, steady-state inﬂation will be
equal to the inﬂation target, , in the policy rule.
7 Evaluating Monetary Policy Rules for the Euro Area
In a recent paper, Gerlach and Schnabel (1999) argue that average interest rates in the EMU
countries in 1990-98, with the exception of the period of exchange market turmoil in 1992-93,
moved very closely with average output gaps and inﬂation as suggested by the Taylor rule.
Here, we explore the inﬂation and output dynamics that would arise in our model of the
Euro area under such a rule. To this end we present the impulse responses of inﬂation and
output to unexpected demand and supply shocks and also simulate a disinﬂation. In this
exercise, the coecients in the interest rate rule (10) are set equal to the values proposed in
Taylor (1993), that is r =0 , =0 :5a n dq =0 :5. The contract wage specication used
is the RW-S specication preferred by Fuhrer and Moore. For aggregate demand we use
the equation estimated with the German real interest rate. In each case, initial conditions
correspond to the steady state.
We start with an unexpected short-run supply shock, that is in our framework, a shock
24to the contract equation. The standard deviation of this type of shock was estimated as
part of the structural estimation of the overlapping contracts model in section 5. The
eect of such standard deviation shock under a Taylor rule is depicted in Figure 8. The
four panels shows deviations of the output gap, the inﬂation rate, the short-term nominal
interest rate as well as the long-term nominal and real rates from steady state. The shock
occurs in period 10. As a result inﬂation increases over the next four quarters by almost a
full percentage point.
Monetary policy responds to this increase in inﬂation by raising short-term nominal
interest rates suciently so as to increase the long-term real interest rate. This policy
tightening induces a slowdown in aggregate demand which lasts for about four years. Since
future aggregate demand aects contract wage setting and thru this channel the inﬂation
rate, inﬂation eventually returns back to target and even undershoots for a few periods. The
aggressiveness of the policy response, and the depth of the resulting shortfall of aggregate
demand are directly inﬂuenced by the relative strength of the inﬂation and output response
coecents in the interest rate rule. The policymaker is faced with a tradeo, namely
whether to achieve a faster reduction in the inﬂation deviation by accepting a larger output
deviation. Due to the assumption of rational expectations this tradeo depends on all the
model parameters.
As shown in Figure 9, in the case of an unexpected demand shock the policymakers'
is faced with a simpler decision. As shown in the top left panel in response to a 1 percent
surprise increase in demand, the output gap increases by a little more than a full percent
over the rst three quarters and then returns back to potential over the course of the next
two years. As contract wage setting setting takes into account expected future aggregate
demand conditions this improvement in expected demand leads to an increase in inﬂation
of about one percentage point over the same period. Monetary policy responds by raising
short nominal rates enough to increase the long-term real rate and return output to potential
and inﬂation to target. Of course, the higher the coecients in the policy rule, the faster
both output and inﬂation would return to steady state. There is no conﬂict of interest
25in that respect. One concern, which may restrain policymakers from reacting much more
aggressively, is regarding the degree of interest rate variability.
Finally, Figure 10 reports a disinﬂation by 2 percentage points. It is modelled as a
fully credible change in the policymaker's inﬂation target,  in the policy rule (10), from
2 percent to 0 percent. Initial conditions are consistent with a steady state inﬂation rate
of 2 percent. As can be seen in the lower-left, the reduction in the inﬂation target leads
to an increase in short-term nominal interest rates. As a result, the long-term real rate
increases and the output gap turns negative. The slowdown in aggregate demand induces
disinﬂationary conditions and the inﬂation rate declines to the new steady state level over
the course of 2 1/2 years. The change in policy target also has a direct eect on inﬂation
thru inﬂation expectations, which accelerates the disinﬂation and reduces the associated
output loss. This eect is directly apparent from the behavior of long-term nominal and
real interest rates. Because the disinﬂation is fully credible, long-term nominal rates which
embody expectations of future short rates decline throughout the full perod. Nevertheless,
the initial increase in short rates still implies an initial increase in the long-term real rate.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we estimate a small-scale empirical model of the Euro area where short-run real
eects of monetary policy arise due to overlapping wage contracts. The paper primarily fo-
cussed on exploring the empirical t of alternative overlapping wage contract specications,
because they are the key ingredient for the short-run inﬂation-output variability tradeo
faced by monetary policymakers. We investigate the nominal wage contracting model due
to Taylor (1980) as well as three dierent versions of the relative real wage contracting
model rst proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (1981) and investigated empirically with U.S.
data by Fuhrer and Moore (1995a). Contrary to Fuhrer and Moore, who reject the nominal
contracting model and prefer a version of the relative contracting model which induces a
higher degree of inﬂation persistence, we nd that both types of contracting models t the
data for the Euro area. The best tting specication, however, is a version of the rela-
26tive contracting model, which is theoretically more plausible than the simplied version
preferred by Fuhrer and Moore.
To investigate the validity of our results, we also estimate the contracting models for
France, Germany and Italy separately. We nd that the relative contracting model dom-
inates in countries which transitioned out of a high inﬂation regime such as France and
Italy, while the nominal contracting model ts German data better. Thus, an optimist may
conclude that the independent European Central Bank will face a similar environment in
the future as the Bundesbank did in Germany and pick the nominal contracting specica-
tion, while a pessimist, who suspects that stabilizing Euro area inﬂation will require higher
output losses, may want to pick the relative contracting specication. A robust monetary
policy strategy, however, should perform reasonably well in both cases. The use of this
type of model for policy analysis was illustrated by investigating its impulse responses to
demand and price shocks and a disinﬂation under Taylor's interest rate rule.
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32A Estimation by Indirect Inference
To estimate the structural parameters of the overlapping contracts specications we apply
the indirect inference methods proposed by Smith (1993), Gouri eroux, Monfort and Renault
(1993) and developed further in Gouri eroux and Monfort (1995, 1996). Indirect inference is
a simulation-based procedure for calibrating a structural model with the objective of nding
values of its parameters such that its dynamic characteristics match the dynamic properties
of the observed data as summarized by the estimated parameters of an approximating
probability model.22 The latter should t the empirical dynamics reasonably well, but need
not necessarily nest the structural model. The unconstrained VAR model, which we used
as a descriptive device to explore the dynamic interaction of the inﬂation and output data
in section 4 is a natural candidate for such an approximating probability model.
We start with a brief review of standard Maximum-Likelihood (ML) methods used
by Taylor (1993a) and Fuhrer and Moore (199a) for estimating the structural models at
hand in subsection A.1, and then motivate and describe the indirect estimation method in
subsection A.2. We also discuss the asymptotic properties of the indirect estimator as well
as a global specication test which may be used to assess whether the structural model is
consistent with the data. Finally, subsection A.3 provides more detail on the implementation
of the indirect estimation method.
A.1 The ML Estimator
Both, theTaylor and Fuhrer-Moore models have a stationary reduced-form vector autore-
gressive representation
zt = B1 zt−1 + + Bp zt−p + B0 t; (A.1)
where the K-dimensional vector of endogenous variables zt =[ x0
t;y 0
t ]0 comprises a k-
dimensional vector of observable variables yt a n da( K − k)-dimensional vector of non-
observable variables xt such as the contract wage. The K-dimensional vector t is serially
uncorrelated with mean zero and positive semi-denite covariance matrix. The covariance
matrix is assumed to be diagonal with its non-zero elements normalized to unity. The
(K  K)-dimensional coecient matrices Bi = Bi()( i =0 ;1;:::;p) are non-linear func-
tions of an m-dimensional vector of structural parameters  2 , where   Rm denotes
the feasible parameter space. The maximum lag length p of the endogenous variables zt is
equal to the maximum length of the wage contracts minus one. We refer to (A.1) as our
constrained VAR(p) model, although it is more general than a standard VAR model in that
it contains the unobservable variables xt.
22See Due and Singleton (1993) and Gallant and Tauchen (1996) for related approaches relying on
selected sample moments or the scores of the approximating probability model respectively.
33The reduced-form representation of the structural model can alternatively be character-
ized by a family of parametric conditional density functions
F()=
n
f(z−p+1;:::;z 0;); ff(ytjzt−p;:::;z t−1;)g
1
t=1:  2 
o
with an element of F() being denoted by f(). The observed data fyt gT
t=−p+1 is then pre-
sumed to be a sample from f(z−p+1;:::;z 0;)
QT
t=1 f(ytjzt−p;:::;z t−1;) for some  2 .
Usually, the structural parameter vector  may be estimated by Maximum-Likelihood (ML)
methods relying on Kalman ltering techniques (see Fuhrer and Moore (1995a, 1995b)). In
particular, if we condition on xed pre-sample values z−p+1;:::;z 0, the conditional ML
estimator ^ T for  is





Under appropriate regularity conditions the ML estimator ^ T is consistent for the \true"
structural parameter vector 0,
plim
T!1
^ T = 0;
and asymptotically normal,
p
T (^ T − 0)
d −! N[0;^ (0)];
where ^ (0) is the asymptotic covariance matrix of
p
T (^ T − 0).
In practice, however, the ML estimator may be sensitive with respect to the choice
of the partially unobserved initial conditions z−p+1;:::;z 0 and may lack robustness if the
presumed data-generating process f() is mis-specied.
A.2 The Indirect Estimator
Instead of estimating the parameter vector  of the structural model directly, indirect es-
timation starts from an approximating probability model { henceforth auxiliary model {
which is capable of summarizing the dynamic characteristics of the sequence of observed
data fyt gT
t=−p+1.
In the case at hand, the unconstrained k-dimensional VAR(p)m o d e l
yt = A1 yt−1 + + Ap yt−p + ut (A.2)
with ut being serially uncorrelated with mean zero and positive-denite covariance matrix
E[utu0
t]= u is a natural candidate for approximating the structural model, recalling that
the latter has a constrained VAR(p) representation as given by (A.1).
34Throughout, we assume that the unconstrained VAR(p) model (A.2) is stable, i.e.
det(Ik − A1 z −−Ap zp )=0 )j z j > 1;
where jjdenotes the absolute value operator.




~ f(y1−p;:::;y 0;); f ~ f(ytjyt−p;:::;y t−1;)g
1
t=1:  2 B
o
with an element of F() being denoted by f()a n dw h e r e
 =

vec(A1;:::;A p)0;vech(u)0 0 ;
is the n-dimensional parameter vector of the auxiliary VAR(p)m o d e lw i t hn = pk2 +k(k +
1)=2). B  Rn denotes the feasible parameter space. The vec()-operator stacks the
columns of a matrix in a column vector and the vech()-operator stacks the elements on
and below the principal diagonal of a square matrix.
Given a sample fyt gT
t=1 with xed pre-sample values y−p+1;:::;y 0, its dynamic char-
acteristics can be summarized by computing the conditional Quasi-Maximum-Likelihood
(QML) estimator ^ T for ,23




ln ~ f(ytjyt−p;:::;y t−1;):
Under general regularity conditions the QML estimator ^ T is consistent for the \true"
reduced-form parameter vector 0,
plim
T!1
^ T = 0;
and asymptotically normal,
p
T (^ T − 0)
d −! N[0;^ (0)];
23As layed out in Section 4, we assume that the available data fYt g
T
t=−p+1 are a sample of the 2-
dimensional vector of variables Y =[ ;Q]
0 being generated by the linear model
Yt = 0 + 1 t + yt
with fyt g following a stable VAR(p) process as represented by (A.2) above. This type of model has been
advocated by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) for conducting statistical inference in vector autoregressions with
possibly integrated variables.
Substituting (A.2), it becomes obvious that fYt g is assumed to follow a VAR(p) process around a deter-
ministic linear trend,
Yt − 0 − 1 t = A1 (Yt−1 − 0 − 1 (t − 1)) + + Ap (Yt−p − 0 − 1 (t − p)) + ut:
Since we are merely interested in the parameters of the VAR(p) model, i.e. A1;:::;A p and u, we proceed
in two steps. First, we detrend the data by a simple projection technique to obtain the sample fyt g. Second,
using this sample, we compute the QML estimates of the parameters of interest.
35where ^ (0)=H(0)−1I(0)H(0)−1 is the asymptotic covariance matrix of
p
T (^ T−0).
I(0) denotes the asymptotic information matrix and H(0) is the asymptotic expected
Hessian of the appropriately normalized quasi-log-likelihood function evaluated at 0.24
If the auxiliary model F() approximates the structural model F() suciently well, it
makes sense to estimate the vector of structural parameters  indirectly by minimizing the
\distance" between the structural model F() and the auxiliary model tted to the data,
i.e. f(^ T) 2 F(). Thus, the indirect estimator brings the information in ^ T to bear on the
task of estimating the structural parameter vector .
To make this approach operational Gouri eroux, Monfort and Renault (1993) and










and introduce the so-called binding function b:  ! B,







ln ~ f(ytjyt−p;:::;y t−1;)
i
;
which, for a given  2 , identies the density f() 2 F() minimizing the distance between
the particular density f() 2 F() and the elements of the family of densities F().
For a given  2 B, the expectation of the logarithm of the conditional density
ln ~ f(ytjyt−p;:::;y t−1;) has to be determined with respect to the conditional density
f(ytjzt−p;:::;z t−1;)f r o mf() 2 F(). While this expectation cannot be obtained an-






ln ~ f(ys()jys−p();:::;y s−1(););
where the simulated sample fys()gS
s=−p+1 is generated by the structural model character-
ized by f() 2 F().
Obviously, the approximation of the binding function b() coincides with the QML
estimator ^ S() of the auxiliary model using the simulated sample,






ln ~ f(ys()jys−p();:::;y s−1(););
where, without loss of generality, the simulated conditional quasi-log-likelihood function has
been normalized by 1=S.
24See White (1994) for a thorough treatment of QML theory and covariance estimation.
36Subsequently, a simulation-based indirect estimator ^ S;T for  is obtained by minimizing
a criterion function QS;T : B   ! R+ which is dened as a quadratic form measuring
the distance between the empirical QML estimator ^ T and the simulated QML estimator
^ S():










^ T − ^ S()

;
where WT(^ T) is a positive denite (n  n)-dimensional weighting matrix which possibly
depends on the QML estimate ^ T. The two subscripts S and T indicate that the partic-
ular object depends on both the empirical sample fyt gT
t=−p+1 and the simulated sample
fys()gS
s=−p+1.
Under appropriate assumptions, the following results can be established.
Proposition: (Asymptotic properties of the indirect estimator)
i. The indirect estimator ^ S;T is consistent for 0,
plim
T!1
^ S;T = 0;
and asymptotically normal,
p
T (^ S;T − 0)
d −! N[0;(1 + c−1)(B0 W B)−1B0 W ^  W B(B0 W B)−1];
where S = cT with c 2 N, B = B(0)=( @=@ 0)b(0), ^  = ^ (0)=
limT!1Var[
p
T(^ T − 0)] and W = W(0) = plimT!1WT(^ T) with 0 =
plimT!1 ^ T.
ii. The asymptotically ecient indirect estimator ^  





of the optimal asymptotic weighting matrix W = −1
^  and is
asymptotically normal,
p
T (^  
S;T − 0)
d −! N[0;(1 + c−1)(B0 −1
^  B)−1]:
iii. If the auxiliary model F() nests the structural model f(0) 2 F(), then the asymp-
totically ecient indirect estimator ^  
S;T is as ecient as the ML estimator ^ T.
iv. Under the null hypothesis that the structural model f(0) 2 F() is correctly specied,
the statistic

















^ T − ^ S()

;
is asymptotically 2-distributed with n − m degrees of freedom.
Proof: Parts i., ii. and iv. of the proposition are alternatively established in Smith (1993),
Gouri eroux, Monfort and Renault (1993) and Gouri eroux and Monfort (1996), chapter 4.5.
Part iii. follows from Gallant and Tauchen (1996), pp. 665-666.
Among the assumptions underlying this proposition is the identication condition that
the equation b()=0 has a unique root at 0 2 . This condition resembles the standard
identication condition in a non-linear equation system. The necessary (order and rank)
condition for identication is n  m.I f n>mholds, n − m overidentifying restrictions
are imposed when estimating . For the asymptotically ecient indirect estimator ^  
S;T
these overidentifying restrictions can be tested by means of the statistic ZS;T(^ T; ^  
S;T). Its
probability value P(Z >z ) gives the probability that the re-scaled minimized criterion
function takes a value larger than that obtained in the estimation exercise. Hereby, a
probabilistic assessment of the consistency of the structural model and the data is obtained.
A.3 Implementation
To estimate the parameters of the dierent wage contracting specications, it is necessary
to close the model in a way that makes it possible to solve for expected future output gaps.
Rather than specifying a complete macroeconomic model for forecasting future output gaps
that enter the contract wage equations, we instead use the reduced-form output gap equation
from the unconstrained VAR(p) model tted to the data. Thus, we conne ourselves to the
parameters of the inﬂation equation in conducting indirect inference. This approach is very
much in the spirit of the limited-information ML procedure applied by Fuhrer and Moore
(1995a). They use the output gap and interest rate equations from a three-dimensional VAR
model to generate the output gap forecasts in the relative real wage contracting equation.
Similarly, Taylor (1993a) used such a reduced-form output gap equation in applying limited-
information ML methods for estimating the structural parameters of the nominal wage
contracting equation.
Let S denote the ((pk+1)(pk2+k(k+1)=2))-dimensional (0;1) selection matrix which
picks the elements of  2 B corresponding to the inﬂation equation, then our asymptotically
ecient indirect estimator ^  












^ T − ^ S()

;
where ^ T and ^ S() are the empirical and the simulated QML estimates of the parameters
38of the unconstrained VAR(p)m o d e la n d( ^ ^ ;T)−1 is a consistent estimate of the optimal
asymptotic weighting matrix W  =(  ^ )−1.
In order to minimize the criterion function Q 
S;T(^ T;) with respect to  2 , we rely
on the sequential dynamic programming algorithm provided by the MATLAB Optimiza-
tion Toolboox.25 This algorithm allows us to take account of the constraints imposed on the
parameter space , thereby guaranteeing the existence of a unique rational expectations
solution. When minimizing Q 
S;T(^ T;), we repeatedly have to simulate samples of the
observable variables fys()gS
s=−p+1 from our structural model in order to compute the sim-
ulated QML estimate ^ S(). These samples are generated by drawing a normally distributed
random sequence fs gS
s=−(~ p+p)+1 and recursively computing the accompanying sequences
of endogenous variables fzs()gS
s=−(~ p+p)+1 by using the structural model's reduced-form
representation (A.1) for varying parameter vectors  2 . The recursions may start from
arbitrary initial values  z, but a suciently large number of simulated values, say ~ p = 100−p,
should be discarded in order to guarantee that the eect of the initial values die out. The
sequences of the observable variables fys()gS
s=−p+1 are subsequently retained from the
sequences fzs()gS
s=−p+1. Note that in repeated simulations the employed random number
generator must always start from the same random seed. Similarly, always the same initial
values  z must be chosen.
Reporting standard errors for the indirect estimate ^  
S;T requires estimation of the
asymptotic covariance matrix ^  =( 1+c−1)(B0 S0 (S ^  S0)−1SB )−1. This matrix may
be consistently estimated by replacing the unknown quantities by consistent estimates,










with BS()=( @=@0) ^ S() being computed by nite dierence methods.
Our experience has been, however, that it is more convenient to estimate the asymptotic
covariance matrix by the inverse of the appropriately normalized Hessian of the criterion
function that is returned by the numerical algorithm,










25See Branch and Grace (1996) for technical details.
39Table 1: Estimates of the Unconstrained VAR Model for the Euro Area
A1 A2 A3 u  104
A. VAR(2) :
0.4879 0.3890 0.0989 -0.2190 0.9871
(0.0963) (0.1709) (0.0899) (0.1688) (0.1518)
0.0481 1.1236 -0.2159 -0.1605 -0.0686 0.2736
(0.0571) (0.0928) (0.0366) (0.1094) (0.0528) (0.0584)
B. VAR(3) :
0.4763 0.4038 0.0995 -0.2272 0.0181 -0.0105 0.9826
(0.0968) (0.1661) (0.1035) (0.2644) (0.1043) (0.1774) (0.1556)
0.0430 1.0758 -0.1804 -0.0450 -0.0426 -0.0740 -0.0701 0.2728
(0.0561) (0.1041) (0.0502) (0.1345) (0.0533) (0.0767) (0.0527) (0.0619)
Note: Estimates of the asymptotic standard errors in parentheses with the asymptotic information matrix
being estimated by the Newey-West (1987) estimator with the lag truncation parameter set equal to 3.Table 2: Estimates of the Unconstrained VAR(3) Model for France, Germany and Italy
A1 A2 A3 u  104
A. France:
0.4898 0.4551 -0.0645 -0.4035 0.1262 0.0506 3.1883
(0.1201) (0.3697) (0.1465) (0.5265) (0.0990) (0.3305) (0.6399)
0.0069 1.1412 -0.0804 -0.0661 0.0291 -0.1499 -0.2390 0.3151
(0.0274) (0.1135) (0.0384) (0.1496) (0.0415) (0.0889) (0.1020) (0.0524)
B. Germany:
0.0334 0.4474 0.2035 -0.0508 0.1402 -0.1270 3.5367
(0.0873) (0.1867) (0.0990) (0.2240) (0.0899) (0.2125) (0.4390)
-0.0190 0.7480 -0.1061 0.1380 -0.0197 0.0692 -0.2614 1.1826
(0.0658) (0.0812) (0.0561) (0.0891) (0.0622) (0.0901) (0.2357) (0.1623)
C. Italy:
0.7137 0.5620 -0.0715 -0.5580 0.0074 0.0502 4.4426
(0.1186) (0.3391) (0.2425) (0.7027) (0.0986) (0.4881) (1.1728)
0.0005 1.3220 -0.0215 -0.3212 -0.0711 -0.0362 0.2931 0.4077
(0.0313) (0.1312) (0.0367) (0.1855) (0.0273) (0.0877) (0.1389) (0.0848)
Note: Estimates of the asymptotic standard errors in parentheses with the asymptotic information matrix
being estimated by the Newey-West (1987) estimator with the lag truncation parameter set equal to 3.Table 3: Estimates of the Staggered Contracts Models for the Euro Area
Relative Real Wage Contracts Nominal Wage
RW RW-C RW-S Contracts (NW)
A. VAR(2): a
s .0658 .1344 0 0
(.0283) (.0330) ( | )b (|)
γ .0016 .0026 .0126 .0070
(.0000) (.0006) (.0033) (.0025)
x .0002 .0009 .0018 .0027
(.0000) (.0002) (.0001) (.0001)
P(Z >z)c .3265[2] .0510[2] .0197[2] .5743[2]
A. VAR(3):
s .1276 .1372 .0742 .0456
(.0401) (.0129) (.0245) (.0465)
γ .0022 .0046 .0212 .0115
(.0011) (.0008) (.0048) (.0053)
x .0003 .0012 .0024 .0038
(.0001) (.0002) (.0003) (.0005)
P(Z >z) .7993[4] .3326[4] .2602[4] .3186[4]
Notes:
a Estimated standard errors in parantheses.
b Estimate on the boundary of the parameter
space.
c Marginal probability value of the test of overidentifying restrictions. Number of overidentifying
restrictions in brackets.Table 4: Estimates of the Staggered Contracts Models for France, Germany and Italy
Relative Real Wage Contracts Nominal Wage
VAR(3) RW RW-C RW-S Contracts (NW)
A. France: a
s .1085 0 .0564 .1189
(.0500) ( | )b (.0230) (.0370)
γ .0036 .0108 .0296 .0041
(.0020) (.0000) (.0066) (.0041)
x .0004 .0052 .0046 .0048
(.0001) (.0000) (.0005) (.0010)
P(Z >z)c .1156[4] .0073[4] .0002[4] .5435[4]
B. Germany:
s .0487 .0376 0 .0501
(.0209) (.0195) ( | ) (.0296)
γ .0061 .0084 .0273 .0195
(.0017) (.0013) (.0064) (.0057)
x .0008 .0054 .0063 .0074
(.0001) (.0007) (.0003) (.0007)
P(Z >z) < 10−5 [4] .0001[4] < 10−7 [4] .0026[4]
C. Italy:
s 1/6 .1244 .0970 n.c.d
( | ) (.0111) (.0162)
γ .0006 .0046 .0141 n.c.
(.0003) (.0010) (.0043)
x .0002 .0023 .0038 n.c.
(.0000) (.0003) (.0005)
P(Z >z) .1575[4] .1574[4] .0709[4]
Notes:
a Estimated standard errors in parantheses.
b Estimate on the boundary of the parameter
space.
c Marginal probability value of the test of overidentifying restrictions. Number of overidentifying
restrictions in brackets.
d No convergence.Table 5: Simulation Based Indirect Estimation of the Structural Parameters
T = 100 T = 200 T = 500
BIASb STD RMSE BIAS STD RMSE BIAS STD RMSE
A.  =0:a
s 13.3 53.2 54.8 22.4 33.9 40.7 13.2 24.9 28.2
γ 42.0 72.2 83.5 3.7 35.2 35.3 -0.2 20.4 20.4
x -13.7 22.7 26.5 -15.9 15.7 22.3 -10.4 12.0 15.9
B.  = 
−1 − 0:001(1+ ): c
s 12.1 52.4 53.8 18.5 35.9 40.3 1.5 27.3 27.4
γ 41.6 66.3 78.2 5.3 37.6 38.0 1.1 20.9 20.9
x -12.4 23.0 26.1 -13.4 16.5 21.3 -5.4 12.4 13.6
Note:
a The structural parameters used for generating the data are s =0 :0742, γ =0 :0212 and x =
0:0024.
b All statistics are reported as fractions of the structural parameters (in percentage points).
c
The innovations to 
 are drawn from a standard normal distribution.Table 6: Estimates of the IS Curve for the Euro Area, France, Germany and Italy
0 1 2 3 d  104 P(J >j)b
A. Euro Area:a
A.1 area-wide rate: 0.0012 1.2347 -0.2737 -0.0364 0.3185 0.1209[5]
(0.0007) (0.0916) (0.1004) (0.0224)
A.2 German rate: 0.0027 1.1807 -0.2045 -0.0947 0.3176 0.2307[5]
(0.0012) (0.1006) (0.1065) (0.0333)
B. France: 0.0024 1.2247 -0.2708 -0.0638 0.3460 0.1977[5]
(0.0008) (0.1275) (0.1284) (0.0234)
C. Germany: 0.0012 0.7865 0.1395 -0.0365 1.2289 0.2518[5]
(0.0027) (0.0686) (0.0825) (0.0874)
D. Italy: 0.0023 1.3524 -0.3852 -0.0544 0.3913 0.4210[5]
(0.0009) (0.0845) (0.0804) (0.0236)
Notes:
a GMM estimates using a vector of ones and lagged values of the output gap (qt−1;q t−2), the







instruments. The weighting matrix is estimated by means of the Newey-West (1987) estimator with
the lag truncation parameter set equal to 7. Estimated standard errors in parantheses.
b Marginal
probability value of the J-test of overidentifying restrictions. Number of overidentifying restrictions in
brackets.Figure 1: The Euro-Area Data
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Source: ECB area-wide model database (see Fagan et al. (1999)). Aggregation over data for the member countries
of the Euro area using xed 1995 GDP weights at PPP rates. The OECD output gap is obtained by interpolating
the annual gures reported in OECD (1999).Figure 2: The Data for France, Germany and Italy


























France: Real GDP and Trend (logs)





Germany: Real GDP and Trend (logs)





Italy: Real GDP and Trend (logs)









Source: ECB multi-country model database.
48Figure 3: Estimated Autocorrelations of the Unconstrained VAR(3) Model for the Euro Area
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Notes: Solid line: Estimated autocorrelations. Dotted lines: Estimated autocorrelations plus/minus twice their
estimated asymptotic standard errors.Figure 4: Estimated Autocorrelations of the Constrained VAR(3) Models for the Euro Area
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Notes: Solid line with bold dots: RW model. Dash-dotted line: RW-C model. Solid line: RW-S model. Dashed
line: NW model. Dotted lines: Estimated autocorrelations of the unconstrained VAR(3) model plus/minus twice
their estimated asymptotic standard errors.Figure 5: Estimated Autocorrelations of the VAR(3) Models for France
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Notes: Solid line with bold dots: RW model. Dashed line: NW model. Solid line: Estimated autocorrelations of
the unconstrained VAR(3) model. Dotted lines: Estimated autocorrelations of the unconstrained VAR(3) model
plus/minus twice their estimated asymptotic standard errors.Figure 6: Estimated Autocorrelations of the VAR(3) Models for Germany
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Notes: Solid line with bold dots: RW model. Dashed line: NW model. Solid line: Estimated autocorrelations of
the unconstrained VAR(3) model. Dotted lines: Estimated autocorrelations of the unconstrained VAR(3) model
plus/minus twice their estimated asymptotic standard errors.Figure 7: Estimated Autocorrelations of the VAR(3) Models for Italy
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Notes: Solid line with bold dots: RW model. Solid line: Estimated autocorrelations of the unconstrained VAR(3)
model. Dotted lines: Estimated autocorrelations of the unconstrained VAR(3) model plus/minus twice their
estimated asymptotic standard errors.Figure 8: Contract Wage Shock [1 Standard Deviation]
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Long−Term RatesFigure 10: Disinﬂation [2 Percentage Points]
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